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This study attempts to extend the theoretical argument on the effect of high-status 
affiliations and the role of audiences in the process of performance evaluation. 
Because the status of an actor is dependent on the context that the actor is located
in, it is problematic to conclude that positive effect of high-status affiliations is 
constant regardless of the category-based identity of affiliating actors. I suggest 
that an actor's rewards from high-status affiliations are contingent on the extent to 
which category-based identity of the actor overlaps with that of its affiliates. Two 
types of audiences -conformity-seeking and novelty-seeking- are expected to draw 
different judgments on the category overlap between affiliating parties, moderating 
the effect of high-status affiliations on actor's reward. 
I tested the predictions by investigating the collaboration between actors 
and directors in the context of Korean feature film industry from 2006 to 2015. 
Confirming the earlier researches, I found that actors who collaborated with high-
status directors were likely to attain greater box-office success and receive more 
awards than those who collaborated with low-status directors. For actor's box-
office success, the positive effect of directors’ status was strengthened with the 
overlap of genre identity between them. For actor's artistic recognition, however, 
the favorable effect of high-status affiliations was attenuated with genre overlap.
Keywords: High-status affiliations, category, organizational identity, audience 
heterogeneity, social network analysis, film industry
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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
An organization can climb the ladder of status by affiliating with desired partners 
(Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Piazza & Castellucci, 2014; 
Podolny & Phillips, 1996; Sauder, Lynn, & Podolny, 2012; Slavich & Castellucci, 
2016; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). This upward mobility is thought to be 
beneficial for the focal organization for two reasons. First, viewing networks as 
pipes or conduits, resources, information, and opportunities flow from high-status 
to low-status actors, thus providing a chance to improve the actual quality of the 
product (Podolny, 2001b). Second, an organization affiliated with high-status 
partners can achieve greater success regardless of actual product quality because of 
the signaling value of networks. Benjamin and Podolny (1999) find that wineries 
with high-status appellations get greater profits by claiming higher prices than 
those who affiliated with low-status appellations for a comparable quality of the 
product. Stuart et al. (1999) indicate that young biotechnology firms affiliated with 
high-status strategic alliance partners and investors achieve more favorable 
performance consequences. More recent research also confirms these findings in 
the haute cuisine industry by showing that chefs affiliated with high-status masters 
at the early stage of their career tend to get better evaluations from critics than 
those with low-status masters (Slavich & Castellucci, 2016). 
However, affiliation with high-status partners might have opposing 
effects depending on the context in which actors are located in (Benjamin & 
Podolny, 1999: 581; Jensen, 2003; Jensen, Kim, & Kim, 2011). Specifically, 
coordinating with high-status partners whose status is based on the context 
relevant to the focal actor’s position is expected to guarantee positive performance 
consequences. This positive outcome is attributable to stats spillover effects 
because the third-parties who have an interest in the given segment of the market 
might view the focal actor positively. On the contrary, if an actor is affiliating with 
a high-status partner whose social position is grounded in a disparate context, 
partners’ prominence is less likely to provide benefit to the focal actor (Jensen et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, affiliations between actors who have different category 
identities may confuse audiences because their collaboration can be perceived as 
unusual. It suggests that simultaneous consideration of partner’s status in market 
and category identity is necessary to explains the performance consequences of 
high-status affiliations. 
In this paper, I argue that an actor’s rewards from high-status affiliations 
are contingent on the extent to which category identity of the actor overlaps with 
that of its partner. To develop a theoretical argument, I limit the scope of this 
research to feature film industries where the status of affiliating partners is critical 
because of the difficulty of objective assessment of product quality (Delmestri, 
Montanari, & Usai, 2005; Ertug, Yogev, Lee, & Hedström, 2016; Yogev, 2010). 
Since cultural goods are commercial products as well as artistic creations, 
performances in cultural industries are often evaluated inconsistently by 
heterogenous groups of audiences. Two primary groups of audiences- critics and 
industry peers respectibly- have substantial power over these two distinct types of 
valuations. Specifically, critics’ favorable evaluation of a cultural product leads to 
high commercial performance because their coverage attracts the attention of 
potential customers while industry peers’ assessment of the product plays a pivotal 
role in artistic recognition. 
The current study not only contributes to studies on high-status 
affiliations by incorporating category identity of affiliating parties but also extends 
studies on the role of audiences by taking audience heterogeneity into 
consideration. Specifically, high-level of category overlap between the affiliates 
are expected to be perceived positively in the eye of critics who seek conformity, 
strengthening the positive effect of high-status affiliations. On the contrary, 
industry peers who are more open to novel innovation are likely to prefer low-level 
of category overlap, because they acknowledge the importance of recombining 
established categories in deriving innovative outcome. 
I tested the hypotheses by investigating the collaboration between actors 
and directors in the context of the Korean film industry from 2006 to 2015. 
Confirming the previous findings on the positive effect of high-status affiliations 
on the focal actor’s performance, actors who collaborate with high-status directors 
were likely to attain greater box-office success and receive more awards than those 
who collaborate with low-status directors (Faulkner, 1983; Rossman, Esparza, & 
Bonacich, 2010). However, the effect was moderated by genre overlap between 
and the focal actor and directors. Findings show that high-level of genre overlap 
had a positive moderating effect on actors’ box-office success while it had a 
negative moderating effect on the number of awards assigned to the focal actor. 
 
 
Ⅱ. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
ⅰ. Domain-Specificity of Audiences and the Interaction Effect 
of Status and Category Identity 
Extant literatures suggest that affiliating with high-status partners is beneficial for 
improving focal actor’s performance (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Stuart et al., 
1999). The explanation on the advantage of high-status affiliations is twofold 
depending on the definition of status. In earlier researches, status is defined as 
‘signal of quality’ which delivers information to potential consumers (Podolny, 
1993). From this perspective, relational information such as high-status affiliations 
is important que that helps customers infer product quality since actual quality of 
the product is not known to external parties until direct consumption of the product 
(Podolny, 1993, 2001a; Sauder et al., 2012). Thus, connection to the high-status 
partners can be a significant resource to the focal organization.  
However, more recent researchers posit that status is more than a signal of 
quality (Jensen et al., 2011; Piazza & Castellucci, 2014). While they do agree with 
the idea that status is an indicator of product quality, the highlight is on the idea 
that conceptualization of status should be grounded in viewing market as socially 
constructed space (Piazza & Castellucci, 2014: 292). From this broader perspective, 
status is defined as organization’s social position or rank order given that the 
market has a hierarchical structure (Jensen & Roy, 2008; Washington & Zajac, 
2005).  
Viewing status as rank in social system suggests that the advantage of 
high-status affiliations stems from the third-parties’ perception of relationships. 
Deference that accrues to high-status partners will be transferred to the focal 
organization since their ongoing relationship promotes audiences’ perceived 
association between high-status partner’s prominence and the capability of focal 
actor (Stuart et al., 1999). Thus, the embeddedness of organizations in social 
system generates ‘non-performance based advantage’ to actors by influencing the 
perception of audiences (Sorenson, 2014). Therefore, from this broader 
conceptualization on status which incorporates organization’s rank order in social 
space as well as signaling aspects, it is necessary to take the audiences into 
consideration when studying high-status affiliation.  
In the cognitive structure of audiences, the context which gives meaning 
to status is demarcated by category boundaries. Even though organization first 
initiates their domain of market activity by producing specific types of product, it is 
audiences’ confirmation and approval that ultimately determines their future 
economic behavior (Hsu & Hannan, 2005). Because categorical boundaries are a 
useful tool for audiences by helping them to grasp the typical characteristics of an 
organization, audiences confer collective identity to a group of actors based on 
established category (DiMaggio, 1987; Zerubavel, 2009). Thus, prior studies 
indicate that external audiences rely on categories to make sense of an organization 
(Hsu, 2006a; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2005; Zuckerman, 1999).  
Rank held by an organization within social space is usually contingent on 
the context that an organization is located in because each domain has distinct 
groups of audiences. Audiences are “collections of agents with an interest in a 
domain and control over material and symbolic resources that affect the success 
and failure of the claimants in the domain” (Hsu & Hannan, 2005: 476). Because of 
this domain-specificity of audiences, accepted rank order of an organization in one 
market may or may not be transferrable to another market. For example, a prior 
study on the transferability of status suggests that signaling value of status based on 
a market is likely to be stronger in the market than other contexts (Jensen, 2003: 
472). For this reason, Jensen et al. (2011) emphasize that an actor’s social position 
entails its category identity and rank at the same time. Building on this argument I 
suggest that the theoretical argument on the consequence of high-status affiliations 
should be expanded by incorporating category identity.  
 
 
ⅱ. Categorical Alignment in Dyadic Relationship and 
the Role of Audiences 
Previous studies emphasize affiliating partner’s status as an important indicator of 
focal actor’s performance under uncertainty (Podolny, 1993, 2001a; Sorenson, 
2014; Stuart et al., 1999). However, I propose that affiliate’s category identity is a 
simultaneously critical factor for predicting the focal actor’s rewards because both 
affiliate’s status and category construct audience’s perception. When category 
identity is taken into consideration, an affiliation of two actors is divided into two 
cases depending on the existence of categorical alignment which I define as 
affiliating actors’ overlap of category identity. In the current study, categorical 
alignment refers to the situation where two actors reside within the same niche in 
horizontal market space.  
First, if two actors are affiliating while maintaining categorical alignment, 
the collaboration between them ensures maintaining established identities as 
audiences’ cognition on their identity remains stable. Moreover, category overlap 
between collaborating actors is expected to strengthen their collective identity by 
facilitating audiences’ perception on clustering process. On the other hand, if two 
actors are affiliating without maintaining categorical alignment, the level of 
perceived association between the focal actor and its partner is low. Thus, it may 
take longer time for audiences to interpret the meaning of collaboration or they 
even have to reframe established perception on each actor’s identity.  
The significance of categorical alignment in dyadic relationship raises the 
following question: what is the implication of categorical alignment on the 
performance consequence of high-status affiliations? According to the institutional 
theory that underscores the pressure of conformity, the affiliation between actors in 
the homogeneous category is preferable since it confirms established identity. By 
corresponding to audiences’ perception on actors’ prior identities, audiences are 
likely to perceive their affiliation as legitimate. Previous literatures suggest that 
category spanners who straddle multiple boundaries face sanctions from audiences 
as they fail to signal clear identity (Hsu, 2006a; Leung & Sharkey, 2013; Phillips & 
Zuckerman, 2001; Zuckerman, 1999; Zuckerman & Kim, 2003; Zuckerman, Kim, 
Ukanwa, & Von Rittmann, 2003). Because categorical alignment strengthens 
affiliating parties’ established identity, the focal actor can signal coherent identity 
to the third-parties, and thus they can avoid sanctions from audiences.  
However, above conclusion is questionable because the argument on the 
pressure of conformity focuses on a single type of audience, despite the fact that 
there are distinct groups of audiences within a market. For example, in Zuckerman 
(1999)’s study on ‘illegitimacy discount,' the analytical focus was on the securities 
analysts who play a pivotal role in mediating the buyer-seller relationship in the 
stock market. In this context, securities analysts are specialized by industry, and 
thus their coverage is expected to be dependent on industry boundaries, leading to 
the conformity pressure. However, within a market, different groups of audiences 
exist, and the interpretation of the same information is likely to vary by their 
preferences. For this reason, Jensen and Kim (2014) specified the distribution of 
audience tastes to note that audiences’ preference can be divergent or convergent. 
To incorporate the different taste of audiences, Malter (2012) also divided 
individuals into two groups, conformity-seeking and uniqueness-seeking types. 
Thus, I argue that effect of categorical alignment versus misalignment on 
the focal actor’s rewards from high-status affiliations will be contingent on the 
types of audiences. To be specific, if audiences are seeking novelty rather than 
conformity, categorical misalignment rewards focal organization more in high-
status affiliations. Scholars have highlighted the power of recombination in driving 
innovation (Schumpeter, 2013; Weitzman, 1998). De Vaan, Stark, and Vedres 
(2015) empirically show that collaborating actors’ diversity of cognitive structure 
promotes the possibility of recombining established categories, leading to the 
innovative outcome in video game industry. Because of the possibility innovation 
coming from recombination, audiences who seek novelty may reward more to the 
actors who affiliate without categorical alignment.  
 
ⅲ. Empirical Setting and Hypotheses: High-status 
Affiliations in a Film Industry 
Scholars have recognized that affiliate’s status have a positive effect on focal 
actor’s performance in various context (Piazza & Castellucci, 2014). However, the 
effect is expected to be especially stronger in cultural market. Objective assessment 
on cultural products such as film, architecture and fine arts is barely possible 
because differences in quality among products are difficult to identify (DiMaggio, 
1977; Ertug et al., 2016). Thus, the status of affiliating partner has been pointed as 
an important indicator of success, guiding audiences’ evaluation (Yogev, 2010).  
Participants in film market confront uncertainties caused by shifts in 
consumers’ taste and variability in evaluation criteria employed by critics (Hirsch, 
1972: 645). Among the film market participants, however, directors and actors are 
likely to face a higher level of uncertainty than others because producers and 
distributors can release uncertainty to some extent by leveraging their investment, 
while actors and directors do not have a similar opportunity to engage in several 
films at a time. Accordingly, actors and directors have to carefully choose their 
collaborating partner because it is the primary source of reducing uncertainty (Usic, 
2004). Thus, in current research, I focus on actor-director collaboration relationship 
to investigate moderating effect of categorical alignment on the focal actor’s 
rewards from high-status affiliations. 
Films are cultural products which have a dual nature in that “they are 
simultaneously  economic products and artistic creations” (Delmestri et al., 2005: 
975). For this reason, film performance has been evaluated by two dimensions: 
commercial success and artistic merit (Delmestri et al., 2005; Hadida, 2009). In the 
film industry, two particularly important groups of audiences engage in the process 
of performance assessment and artistic performance respectively: critics and peers. 
Critics are important third-party in film market because they mediate the 
relationship between filmmakers and moviegoers. Scholars have shown the role of 
critics in attracting the attention of final consumers in the context of cultural 
industries (Eliashberg & Shugan, 1997; Holbrook, 1999; Litman, 1983). For 
example, critics’ coverage on films affects prospect moviegoers’ decision-making 
process (Eliashberg & Shugan, 1997; Hsu, 2006b; Litman & Ahn, 1998; Litman, 
1983). On the other hand, peers such as film directors, screenwriters, and 
cinematographers are allowed to participate in the award process, expressing 
industry opinion on cinematic excellence and artistic quality of films. Accordingly, 
recognition of peers leads to greater artistic achievements. 
Taking two types of audiences into consideration, I argue that directors’ 
status has a positive influence on actor’s economic and artistic performance. Both 
critics and industry peers perceive that an actor who collaborate with high-status 
directors is likely to have reliable skills and capacity. Also, perceived association 
between director’s prominence and actor’s capability will increase the probability 
of attaining successful performance consequences. Empirically, Rossman et al. 
(2010) found that actors are most likely to get Academy Award nomination when 
they are collaborating with high-status peers. Because critics also acknowledge 
director’s authorship, identifying film with the director, they may view actors 
affiliated with high-status directors positively. Thus, I present following baseline 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1a: An actor who collaborates with high-status directors 
is more likely to attain commercial success than an actor who works 
with low-status directors. 
Hypothesis 1b: An actor who collaborates with high-status directors 
is more likely to achieve artistic recognition than an actor who works 
with low-status directors. 
However, the impact of directors’ status on actor’s commercial and artistic 
performance will be contingent on the categorical alignment between directors and 
the focal actor. As mentioned in the previous section, the category identity of 
affiliates is simultaneously important in predicting the performance consequences 
of high-status affiliations because the status of an actor is dependent on specific 
context that the actor is located in.  
In the film market, genre categories are analogous to product categories. 
By classifying films based on stylistic elements, genre information provides a 
framework to make sense of typical characteristic of the movie. Because prior 
participation in certain film genres may shape audiences’ perception, audiences are 
likely to have different expectations on actors based on the film genre that they 
worked in the past. Similarly, directors can be classified by the genre of films that 
they produced. Thus, I use film genre as a proxy for classifying the category 
identity of actors and directors.  
Following the definition of categorical alignment which refers to 
affiliating actors’ overlap of category identity, an actor may experience categorical 
alignment when there is a high level of similarity between the composition of film 
genres that he or she had worked in the past and that his or her partners participated. 
Conversely, affiliation without categorical alignment in our empirical context 
occurs when there is a lack of genre overlap between an actor and his or her 
affiliates. 
Given the two primary groups of audiences in the film market, critics and 
peers, I argue that categorical alignment has mixed results on focal actor’s 
commercial and artistic performance depending on the types of audiences. 
Specifically, I expect that categorical alignment between an actor and directors will 
be perceived positively by critics, strengthening the effect of partners’ status on the 
actor’s commercial success. As mentioned above, critics mediate potential 
customers and filmmakers by shaping consumers’ perception of the film. Even if 
the critics’ belief can affect consumers’ selection of films, an overriding factor in 
shaping consumers’ perception is the number of critical coverage written by critics. 
Regardless of critics’ judgment of film, the critical review itself is a primary source 
of information for consumers to rely on when they are trying to make sense of the 
movie. Receiving greater attention from critics thus precedes meeting greater 
consumer demands which will eventually lead to attaining commercial success.  
Because critic’s attention has limited capacity and because they have to 
legitimize their evaluation criteria as an expert, critics may have professional 
specialties based on the classification of the category. Thus, they are likely to seek 
actors’ conformity in particular category. In support of this, Hsu (2006b: 5) argue 
that “critics are likely to avoid offerings from categories in which they have not 
developed coherent schemas for evaluation because they feel less confident in their 
ability to make and defend claims regarding quality in these arenas.” In a similar 
vein, empirical studies reveal that that films that span multiple genres suffers 
illegitimacy discount (Hsu, 2006a; Hsu, Hannan, & Koçak, 2009). Thus, 
categorical alignment between and actor and directors is likely to attract more 
attention from critics. 
On the contrary, industry peers look for novelty and thus categorical 
misalignment between an actor and directors will be perceived positively in the eye 
of industry peers, strengthening the relationship between partners’ status and the 
focal actor’s artistic recognition. Unlike critics, elite peers may seek novelty rather 
than conformity. Delmestri et al. (2005: 977) suggest that artistic recognition is a 
signal of “path-breaking artistic innovation” pursued by restricted cultural elite. 
This tendency can be found in the speech of chief delegate who belongs to a 
prominent film festival. For example, Cannes artistic director Thierry Fremaux 
mentioned that “The Festival de Cannes is a celebration of cinematographic art. I 
exist to showcase the new writing, new genres and new visual innovations of our 
time”, emphasizing the creative and novel aspect of the film among various 
selection criteria. Thus, industry peers are likely rewards more to an actor who 
works with directors from different backgrounds regarding the film genre. 
Hypothesis 2a: Categorical alignment between an actor and the 
directors whom he or she collaborate with strengthens the positive 
relationship between directors’ status and the focal actor’s 
commercial success.  
Hypothesis 2b: Categorical alignment between an actor and directors 
whom he or she collaborate with weakens the positive relationship 







ⅰ. Data and Sample 
Empirical context of the current research is Korean feature film industry. For our 
study, I collected data on entire feature films released in Korea from 2006 to 2015. 
I obtained data from open API provided by Korean Box Office Information 
System1. The data include descriptive information on films such as genre, title, 
release date, production year, the name of directors, the name of lead and 
supporting actor, distributor, producing firm, box-office gross, and the number of 
audiences. To gather information about the work history of actors and directors I 
backed up the data using the database provided by Korean Film Council2 and 
Korean Movie Database3. Both of them provide information on cast and crew 
including their filmography, gender, age, and the awards assigned to each 
individual. 
Unit of analysis in the current study is an actor, and the sample was 
selected based on two criteria. First, I included actors who participated in at least 
one films released in Korea from 2006 to 2015. Second, I restricted observations to 
actors who played the lead role in each film and excluded actors with a supporting 
role. 
From 2006 to 2015, 1,772 lead actors participated in at least one movie. 
However, because database before 2009 does not include observations on box-
office results of each film, I excluded observations from 2006 to 2008 to estimate 
the box-office gross. However, I included all observations from 2006 to 2015 to 
estimate the number of awards assigned to actors. Thus, actor-year panel data for 
estimating box-office gross consist of 2,097 observations on 1,476 lead actors from 
2009 to 2015. Data for estimating the number of awards consist of 2,797 




Box-office gross. Previous studies indicate that box-office revenue or the 
number of attendance reflects moviegoers’ selection of the film (Delmestri et al., 
2005; Hadida, 2009). Thus, empirical researches on film performances exploited 
box-office results to measure the commercial performance of the films (Hsu, 
2006a; Zuckerman & Kim, 2003). Building on these literature, I averaged domestic 
box-office gross of films that the actor participated in a given year to capture the 
commercial success of an actor. Because the distribution of average box-office 
revenue is skewed, I transformed the data using natural log. 
Number of Awards. Awards have been understood as the reflection of 
creativeness because industry peers engage in the selection processes. Scholars 
note that award is an “institutionalized measure of film quality and excellence” 
(Holbrook, 1999: 149). Even though artistic recognition and commercial success 
are likely to be mutually enhancing, studies reveal that these two dimensions are 
rather distinct. For example, researchers indicate that there is a negative correlation 
between award-winning and commercial success (Ginsburgh, 2003; Ginsburgh & 
Weyers, 1999; Hadida, 2003). To capture an actor’s artistic recognition, I 
aggregated the number of domestic and international awards assigned to an actor in 
a given year.  
 
Independent Variables. 
Directors’ status. Although there are various types of affiliates from actor’s 
perspective such as director, producer, screenwriter, distributor, editor, and 
cinematographer, I focus on directors as an actor’s collaborating partners. Films are 
often identified as directors’ artistic creature because of their authorship. Thus, 
compared to other crew members, visibility of directors will be higher than other 
crew members in the perception of audiences. To measure the status of a director I 
went through the following three steps.  
Following the definition of status, actor’s rank order in social space, I first 
unveil director’s social position in the film market. To begin with, I construct a 
two-mode network which includes a set of directors and a set of actors for a given 
year. In the bipartite graph, the link between actor and director means their joint 
participation in filmmaking. Thus, in this director-by-actor matrix ,  equals to 
1 if the director  worked with the actor  on the same filmmaking project.  
Next, I transformed this bipartite graph  into the one-mode network, 
, which is composed only of directors. In  adjacency matrix,  equals 
to 1 if the director and  had worked with the same actor at least one time in the 
past. Because directors are connected to each other through actors, tie between two 
directors can be interpreted as their reliance on same the actors in film production. 
Thus, given that actors are one of the significant resources in filmmaking, the 
director-by-director adjacency matrix can be seen as ‘directors’ resource sharing 
network’ in that each cell in this adjacency matrix represents two actor’s niche 
overlap.  
Lastly, I measured directors’ degree centrality using ‘directors’ resource 
sharing network’ to capture status because it reflects director’s position within a 
network structure. A director with high degree centrality in the resource sharing 
network means he or she is collaborating with actors who work with other directors. 
Because superstars or known actors collaborate with various directors, a director 
with high degree centrality is the one who works with known actors. Therefore, 
they can garner diverse and valuable resources. By the same logic, directors with 
low degree centrality may work with a limited number of unknown actors who 
rarely cast by other directors.  
After calculating degree centrality of each director, I divided the 
observation into two groups. Thus the observation was coded one if the average of 
directors’ status was greater than the median. I used a ten-years moving window 
starting because the degree centrality in this networks had the highest correlations 
with the number of awards assigned to each director.  
 
Moderator variable. 
Categorical alignment. Since film genres are parallel to product categories 
(Hannan, 2010), each actor and his or her collaborating director have their category 
identity based on the genre of films that they worked in the past.  
To measure the time-varying degree of actor-director genre overlap, I first 
collected data regarding the genre code of films that each actor and director 
participated in a year and any of previous years. I constructed 17-dimensional 
vectors for all actors and directors whom they affiliated with based on this 
information. For example,  dimension in this vector represents the number of 
participation in film projects which have genre code . The 17 genre codes I used 
are documentary, drama, romance, mystery, western, action, horror, adventure, war, 
comedy, fantasy, criminal, musical, thriller, family, science fiction and sa-geuk 
(Korean traditional film). Thus, information on each participant’s involvement in 
17 kinds of the genre is represented in this vector. 
Using genre involvement vector of each actor and director, I calculated 
cosine similarity score between the dyad. Cosine similarity measures cosine of the 
angle between two vectors. In the field of organizational study, cosine similarity 
has been used to measure niche overlap between two actors (Sohn, 2001), 
similarity in product composition between focal actor and its alliance partner (Lee, 
2007) and “pairwise product market complementarities” which refers to 
consumers’ tendency to use products from both markets (Lee, Venkatraman, 
Tanriverdi, & Iyer, 2010). Thus, cosine similarity can be seen as a relevant 
construct to measure overlap of genre category between an actor and his or her 
affiliate. I averaged the cosine similarity score between the dyads if an actor 
collaborated with more than one director in a year.  
 
Control Variables. 
Actor’s Status. Previous literature reveals that actors tend to collaborate with 
partners who have similar status with themselves (Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; 
Podolny, 1994; Podolny & Phillips, 1996). Thus, I control for the effect of actor’s 
status because it is expected to be correlated with directors’ status. Measurement of 
the focal actor’s status has to capture the actor’s relative position among other 
players. To measure an actor’s social location, I constructed two networks 
sequentially.  
First, I constructed a matrix of actor-by-film affiliation network (  
where  equals to 1 if actor  performed in the film . I transformed this 
network into actor-by-actor adjacency matrix (  by multiplying  and its 
transpose. In this actor-by-actor network, actors are connected to each other 
through the films that they jointly participated. Following the common practice, I 
assume that actors who jointly participated in the same project know each other 
(Cattani & Ferriani, 2008; Newman, 2001; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005).  
Based on this actor-by-actor network, I computed eigenvector centrality. 
Faulkner (1983: 169) suggests that “actors who are tied to important actors are 
themselves more important than those who tied to an equal number of actors on the 
periphery of collaboration network.” Thus, I chose eigenvector centrality as a 
proper measurement which reflects actor’s status. Similar to Bonacich centrality 
with positive  which captures “degree to which an individual’s status is a 
positive function of the statuses of those whom he or she is connected” (Bonacich, 
1987: 1170), eigenvector centrality “weights contacts according to their 
centralities” (Bonacich, 2007: 555). Eigenvector centrality thus reflects the concept 
that actors who are linked to high-status alters will be located in the higher position 
in vertical space than those who are linked to low-status alters. I used three-years 
moving window following the common practice.  
Tenure. Novice actors may have less opportunity to collaborate with high-status 
directors than an experienced actor. Thus, I control for the effects of tenure.  
Number of films. I included the number of films that actor participated because it is 
expected to be positively related to partner’s status and categorical alignment.  
Gender. I control for gender because actresses were less likely to get lead role than 
actors in our data. 
Major Distributor. Engagement of major distributor increases the visibility of films 
and attracts more attention from audiences. Thus, I included Major Distributor 
variable to control for the effect of major distributor’s engagement. Specifically, it 




Model 1: Commercial success.   
In the first model, I test our hypotheses regarding commercial performance. The 
dependent variable was measured by averaging domestic box-office revenue of 
films that an actor participated in a given year.  
Distribution of individual talent among actors may constrain or promote 
the opportunity to collaborate with the high-status director. Therefore, to control for 
this unobserved individual-level heterogeneity, I used fixed-effects OLS regression 
model. Moreover, Hausman rejected the null hypothesis that random-effects model 
is appropriate. This result supports our use of fixed-effects regression.  
, 
where  indicates actor i’s affiliation with the high-status director in year t, 
 indicates categorical alignment between actor i and the directors in year t, 
 indicates the set of control variables,  indicates time-invariant actor’s 
attributes and  indicates error term.  
 
Model 2: Artistic recognition.   
In the second model, I test hypotheses regarding artistic performance. The 
dependent variable in this model the total number of award assigned to an actor in 
a given year. Because our dependent variable is count data with many zeros, fitting 
linear regression model which assumes continuous dependent variable to the data 
may lead to biased results. Thus, I assume that our dependent variable follows 
Poisson distribution. Accordingly, the expected number of awards assigned to an 
actor is specified in the following way: 
 
This equation can be expressed as follows: 
 
where  indicates actor i’s affiliation with the high-status director in year t, 
 indicates categorical alignment between actor i and the directors in year t, 
 indicates the set of control variables,  indicates time-invariant actor’s 
attributes and  indicates error term.  
Similar to model 1, unobserved individual-level attributes are expected to 
cause endogeneity. To deal with this issue, I chose to use generalized estimating 
equation to estimate the model. Although fixed-effects models provide better 
control for time-invariant individual attributes, GEE allows efficient use of data 
compared to fixed models (Schneper & Guillén, 2004: 284). Because of the 
presence of over-dispersion in our data, I also estimated the negative binomial 
model using GEE.  
 
Ⅳ. RESULTS 
ⅰ. Model 1: Commercial success   
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 1. To identify the 
existence of multicollinearity problem, I computed variance inflation factor for 
each variable in the model. VIF statistics for all the variables including an 
interaction term in the model were less than 10 and the mean VIF was 3.69, 
































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 2 reports the result of fixed-effects OLS regression on box-office 
gross. Model (1) includes all control variables, actor’s tenure, the number of films 
that an actor participated in any of previous years, the engagement of major 
distributors, and actor’s status. It shows that major distributor’s engagement has a 
positive effect on the commercial success of films (p<0.001). In support of 
previous studies on the positive effect of focal actor’s status on its performance 
consequences (Podolny & Phillips, 1996; Podolny, Stuart, & Hannan, 1996), 
actor’s status has a positive influence on commercial success (p<0.001).  
Table 2. Fixed-effects OLS Regression on Box-office Gross 
Variables  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Tenure -0.04 -0.05* -0.05* 
 (-1.70) (-2.18) (-2.17) 
No. of films 0.02 0.011 0.01 
 (1.44) (0.75) (0.74) 
Major distributor 0.68*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 
 (8.34) (6.97) (6.96) 
Actor's status 7.16*** 5.81*** 5.81*** 
 (5.05) (4.44) (4.43) 
Categorical alignment  0.26* 0.24 
  (2.35) (1.41) 
Directors’ status - high or low  0.94*** 0.92*** 
  (9.58) (6.98) 
Directors’ status  Categorical alignment   0.03 
   (0.18) 
Constant 8.13*** 7.82*** 7.82*** 
 (46.25) (47.62) (46.82) 
R-square (within)  0.15 0.28 0.29 
F 27.96 41.76 35.74 
    
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Two-tailed tests 
  
 
Model (2) tested hypothesis 1a, which predicts that actor’s commercial 
success increases positively with the status of actor’s affiliate. Supporting the 
hypothesis 1a, model (2) shows that holding other variables fixed, affiliating with 
high-status directors lead to increase in actor’s commercial success and the effect 
was statistically significant ( p<0.001). Also, categorical alignment 
between actor and its partner lead to increase in actor’s performance 
( , indicating that an actor who collaborates with directors 
who have similar genre identity with him or her may experience commercial 
success. This model explains 28.95% of within variance in our dependent variable. 
 Hypothesis 2a is about the interaction effect of categorical alignment. 
Specifically, hypothesis 2a predicts that categorical alignment between actor and its 
affiliating partners strengthens the relationship between directors’ status and the 
focal actor’s commercial success. To test this hypothesis, I included the interaction 
term in model (3). As expected, the direction of regression coefficient was positive. 




ⅱ. Model 2: Artistic Recognition   
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations. To evaluate the presence 
of multicollinearity, VIF value for each explanatory variable was computed. VIF 
value of all variables was less than 10 with mean VIF 3.57, suggesting that 
























































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4 presents the GEE estimates on actor’s artistic recognition under 
the assumption that our dependent variable follows passion distribution. Model (1) 
includes all control variables. The coefficient on actor’s status was positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that increase in actor’s status lead to increase in 
the number of awards assigned to the actor.
Table 4.  GEE Estimates on the Number of Awards
(Distributional Specification of Dependent Variable: Poisson)
Variables Model(1) Model (2) Model (3)
Tenure 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.13) (0.72) (0.66)
Gender -0.44 -0.45 -0.42
(-1.88) (-1.95) (-1.82)
No. of films 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.93) (1.60) (1.78)
Major distributor 0.45 0.39 0.40
(1.92) (1.69) (1.79)
Actor's status 11.19*** 10.42*** 10.73***
(5.38) (4.88) (5.16)
Categorical alignment 0.46 1.75**
(0.97) (2.80)
Directors’ status - high or low 0.20 1.07**
(0.61) (2.68)
Directors’ status Categorical alignment -1.99**
(-2.75)
Constant -2.999*** -3.204*** -3.71***
(-14.77) (-13.13) (-10.70)
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Two-tailed tests.
Hypothesis 1b predicts that affiliating with high-status partners lead to an 
increase in artistic recognition. The estimates in model (2) indicates that the effect 
of directors’ status is positive but statistically insignificant. However, as I include 
the interaction term, the effect of directors’ status was positive and statistically 
significant, supporting hypothesis 1b. Moreover, in support of hypothesis 2b which 
predicts that categorical alignment between an actor and directors weakens the 
relationship between directors’ status and focal actor’s performance consequence, 
the interaction effect of high-status director and categorical alignment on artistic 
performance was negative and statistically significant. 
Table 5 reports GEE estimates on actor’s performance under the 
assumption that distribution of dependent variable follows negative binomial 
because of the presence of over-dispersion in the data. The estimates under 
distributional specification of negative binomial yielded similar results.
Table 5. GEE Estimates on the Number of Awards 
(Distributional Specification of Dependent Variable: Negative Binomial)
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Tenure 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.93) (0.58) (0.57)
Gender -0.45 -0.46 -0.45
(-1.86) (-1.91) (-1.91)
No. of films 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.85) (1.46) (1.75)
Major distributor 0.47* 0.42 0.43
(2.00) (1.87) (1.94)
Actor's status 13.18*** 12.21*** 12.54***
(6.37) (5.69) (6.14)
Categorical alignment 0.53 1.79**
(1.11) (2.82)
Directors’ status - high or low 0.14 1.00*
(0.41) (2.53)
Directors’ status Categorical alignment -2.00**
(-2.76)
Constant -3.052*** -3.245*** -3.73***
(-14.76) (-13.20) (-10.70)
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Two-tailed tests.
Ⅴ. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The current study attempts to extend the theoretical argument regarding the 
performance consequence of high-status affiliations by incorporating the concept of 
categorical alignment. Antecedent studies reveal the underlying mechanisms 
regarding the benefits of high-status affiliations by focusing on within category 
setting. However, direct application of the mechanism into affiliation between 
actors from different segments of markets can be problematic because the 
theoretical scope was limited to within category setting. Thus, current research 
contributes studies on the performance consequences of high-status affiliations by 
suggesting that affiliate’s category identity and status are simultaneously important 
factors in predicting focal actor’s reward. 
Secondly, our study highlights the role of different groups of audiences in 
evaluating performance consequences of affiliation between actors with 
homogeneous and heterogeneous category identity. Going further from previous 
studies that focus on critics’ category-based conformity seeking tendency, I take 
another type of audience group into consideration, industry peers who seek novelty. 
Despite these contributions, the present study has a limitation in that a tie 
between two actors is not only a “prism” which delivers informational cue to the 
third-party but also a “pipe or conduit” which delivers resources, information and 
opportunities to the direct parties (Podolny, 2001b). In specific, while I suggest that 
collaboration between two actors with heterogeneous identity lead to artistic 
recognition because of industry peers’ “perception” that their performance may 
have path-breaking innovation, their “actual performances” are likely to have 
innovative elements in that the difference in information that flows between the 
dyad can be seen as a source of innovative outcome.
Burt (1992)’s structural hole theory is in the same line with the argument 
that I suggested above. That is, lack of categorical overlap between collaborating 
actors might be observed in the situation where two actors are located at the 
brokerage positions which connect two separate clusters. In this case, there is low-
level of information redundancy between them, and thus innovative performance 
can be achieved as a result of knowledge sharing. 
Thus, further researches that incorporate two distinct roles of the 
network might contribute to a more comprehensive understanding regarding the 
implication of categorical alignment in dyadic relationships, especially in high-
status affiliation setting. 
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